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Bank Nominee Directors
and Corporate Performance
Micro-Evidence for India
Banks and financial institutions play a major role in governance of non-financial
companies in India through the mechanism of nominee directors. This paper probes two
allied issues: firstly, the isolation of the firm specific factors which determine the
presence of bank nominee directors on boards and secondly, whether companies, with bank
nominee directors exhibit better performance/governance than companies with no banker
representation on their boards. A Probit model estimated over a cross-section of
Indian manufacturing firms for 2003, indicates that bankers on boards seem to exert a
healthy impact on the companies. In fact, large public limited companies are likely to
exhibit banker representation, primarily in their role as expertise providers.
The evidence from Tobit model reconfirms these results.
D M NACHANE, SAIBAL GHOSH, PARTHA RAY
infeasibility of devising a complete contingent contract spelling
out the respective rights of the owner, manager and creditor in
all conceivable situations likely to confront the firm [Grossman
and Hart 1988 and Hart and Moore 1990].
Fama and Jensen (1983) view the board of directors of a non-
financial firm as essentially performing three roles, viz,
(i) effective monitoring of the firm’s short-term performance
(ii) overseeing the firm’s long-term investment strategy and
(iii) alleviating agency conflicts between shareholders,
creditors and management.
An important consequence of the agency problem is the necessity
of protecting both shareholder and creditor rights. So far as the
issue of shareholder rights is concerned, at first glance it might
appear superfluous, considering that it is precisely with the
guaranteeing of these rights, that the board of directors (BoD
for short) is expressly entrusted. However in reality, the BoD
often fails in this role, owing to a variety of circumstances.
Managers and employees may hold equity in the firm, and
minority shareholders may face heavy transaction costs in the
exercise of their statutory voting rights. The extensive empirical
documentation of international corporate practices by La Porta
et al (1997) seems to support the general observation that BoDs
are often captured by the management and are routinely passive
except in extreme circumstances [Mace 1986; Kaplan 1994;
Jensen 1993, etc].
Since creditors are (at least in theory) outside the purview of
the decision-making process in a firm, creditor rights need in-
sulation from adverse selection and moral hazard on the part
of borrowers. These rights to some extent are protected, via, a
variety of control rights that creditors receive when firms default
on debt (e g, repossessing collateral) and also by virtue of the
fact that loans often need to be renewed on a recurring basis.
However, in many countries, the creditor rights are usually
formalised by allowing large creditors to nominate directors on
the BoD [OECD 1995]. This arrangement could be a source of
potential conflict of interests between shareholder and creditor rights.
I
Corporate Governance:
Role of Nominee Directors
The performance of a firm depends on a complex of de-terminants. One particular factor in this complex, viz,corporate governance issues, hitherto a neglected facet of
public policy, has quickly taken centre stage in recent years,
largely as a sequel to the several observed irregularities of major
firms across US and elsewhere. Currently, virtually every major
industrialised economy and major international organisation,
have been making concerted efforts to redefine their views on
how large industrial corporations should be organised and
governed. This concern is reflected not only in academic thinking
[La Porta et al 1998], but also in policy circles [OECD 1999].
The enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the US is
symptomatic of this trend.
While there is by now a rapidly expanding literature on cor-
porate finance [Booth et al 2001; Green et al 2002] and corporate
governance [Joh 2003; Davis 2002; Boubakri et al 2003] as well
as on the interface of these issues with the banking system
[Anderson and Campbell 2003; Adams and Mehran 2003], what
is awaited is a systematic framework within which the inter-
relationship between corporate performance and corporate gover-
nance can be delineated.
As Shleifer and Vishny (1997) remind us, “Corporate gover-
nance deals with the ways in which suppliers of finance to
corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their invest-
ment”. More specifically, corporate governance encompasses the
entire gamut of arrangements under which the firm relates to its
major financial stakeholders, viz, creditors and shareholders,
including most importantly, the legal and other conflict resolution
mechanisms. The source of these potential conflicts is, of course,
the celebrated agency problem [Coase 1937; Jensen and Meckling
1976 and Fama and Jensen 1983], stemming from the separation
of ownership and control in the modern corporation, and the
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More specifically, the fiduciary role of directors to promote the
interests of shareholders can conflict with the role of banker-
director due to different payoff structures of debt and equity.
Apart from regulatory oversight ensuring shareholders’ rights,
and increasing transparency through impartial and accurate
auditing, the role of outside/external members in the BoD of a
company, has been receiving considerable emphasis in recent
years, as a mechanism for ensuring good governance in non-
financial firms. It is being argued that the external members in
the BoD are expected to be relatively free from internal influences
arising out of the day-to-day operations, and hence to take a more
comprehensive view of the overall functioning of the company.
Consistent with this thinking, policy directives have been adopted
in several national jurisdictions (e g, Cadbury Committee Report
in UK 1992), the Blue Ribbon Committee Report and Recom-
mendations in the US (1999), etc) making it mandatory for
companies to have a fixed representation for external directors
on the BoD.
It must be emphasised that there is no consensus on the role
of external directors in ensuring better corporate governance. An
extreme sceptical note is struck in Mace (1986), who quotes a
company president as saying “ What contribution could an outside
director make? Ours is a complex business with national and
international implications…For any outside director to have the
slightest basis for comment, he would have to devote at least
a week, and probably more, to full-time study of the working
papers. The typical outside director does not have time to do this.
And even if he did, what could he add, really to the thinking
of the specialised experts who made the project study?” [also
reproduced in Klein (1998)].
A more moderate but still sceptical view emerges in Monks
and Minow (1995), whose findings suggest that increasing outside
representation on corporate boards may not result in enhanced
shareholder protection (and corresponding reduction in manage-
ment earnings) in the absence of proper incentives to outside
directors, to monitor the company (such as a significant
shareholding).
The scepticism about the role of external directors seems
to be gradually diminishing in the face of mounting evidence
about their largely beneficial impacts on corporate performance
[to wit, the empirical studies of Rosenstein and Wyatt 1990; Booth
and Deli 1999; Chtourou et al 2001, etc]. However, most such
studies enter the important caveat that outside directors may
prove ineffective in the absence of technical or financial expertise.
In view of the noticeable failure of the mere presence of external
directors in curbing excess management earnings [Park and Shin
2004 for example], attention has been focused on one particular
category of external directors, viz, nominees of banks.1  It has
been argued that nominees of financial institutions, in view of
their intimate knowledge of the financial system, could aid in
better corporate governance [Kroszner and Strahan 2001a]. In
the Indian context, the question of a banker on the board has
assumed additional significance in view of the role of represen-
tatives from banks and financial institutions (together referred
to as ‘banker’) as nominee directors. While nominee directors
have primarily the creditors’ interest in mind, given their sig-
nificant lending to non-financial firms, they might be playing
a major role in the governance of a company.2 We can, thus, sub-
divide the sample of Indian firms into two groups, viz, (a) those
which have banker representation on their boards (termed banker-
on-the-board or BoB firms) and (b) those firms which do not
have any banker representation (called banker-not-on-the-board
or BNoB firms). In this context, the present paper raises the
following question: is the behaviour of BoB firms significantly
different from that of BNoB firms?3
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section II gives
an overview of the main issues, while Section III briefly outlines
the practice of nominee directors from banks and financial
institution in the Indian context. The hypotheses and dataset
are detailed in Section IV, with the results being discussed
in Section V. Finally, Section VI gathers the concluding
observations.
II
Banker on Board
Several points of view have emerged on the issue of having
a bank nominee on the BoD of a non-financial firm. First, having
a banker on the board has the potential of enhancing the flow
of information between the firm and the bank, which enables
the financing of the firm to be accomplished through a more
competent assessment of the circumstances of the firm (‘infor-
mation-enhancing role’). Second, a banker joining the board of
a firm acts as a signal to the market that the bank believes the
firm as unlikely to experience financial distress (‘certification
role’). Third, since banks can be expected to protect their senior
creditor status and avoid exposure to lawsuits brought by other
creditors of the distressed firm, banks have an incentive to
maintain an arms-length relationship with the firm (‘senior creditor
role’). In fact, evidence suggests that in the US, one-third of large
firms have a banker on the board. In bank-based systems such
as Japan and Germany, the figures tend to be well over 50 per
cent [Allen and Gale 2000]. This kind of relationship banking
is effectively a means of minimising the risks in a debt contract,
via a process of exclusive exchange and sharing of information
between the particular lender bank and the firm, from which other
potential lenders are excluded [Mayer 1988; Hellwig 1991, etc].
This sharing of information enables lenders to continue the
relationship even during times of financial stress, in return for
the borrower’s commitment to remain with the lender, and to
pay a premium during normal times.
Having a banker on the board could pose several potential
problems as well. A close relationship with the bank may lead
to an information-based monopoly [Rajan 1992]. A pricing
advantage may arise, when a closely tied bank is able to use
information derived from the relationship, to more precisely
match interest rates with project risk than distant, potential
creditors. A bank-based board composition may also facilitate
improved monitoring to guard against opportunism, such as a
reallocation of funds from lower to higher risk projects. Given
the pricing and monitoring advantage of closely tied banks,
bankers not closely tied to the firm are likely to forego the
opportunity to compete for the firm’s loan business (a manifes-
tation of the ‘winner’s curse’). The monopoly that arises from
this information asymmetry becomes problematic for the firm
since it may allow the closely tied bank to extract quasi-rents.
Problems arising from information asymmetry are compounded
by dependence on commercial loan capital, which provides banks
with an information monopoly and corresponding leverage to
extract quasi-rents. Thus, as has been suggested, one might expect
firms with a greater weight of short-term or long-term debt to
have less direct access to capital markets, and those in financial
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distress to be more subject to holdup by board represented banks
[Kroszner and Strahan 2001a]. This reasoning suggests an as yet
unexplored interaction effect between information asymmetry
and dependence.
Some attempts are evident in the recent literature at system-
atically investigating the implications for governance of having
a banker on the board. Booth and Deli (1999), for example,
juxtapose the role of a banker on the board as monitor vis-à-
vis his role as an expertise provider. In their cross-sectional study,
they find evidence that non-lending bankers are associated with
higher debt levels, while no significant relationship exists be-
tween lenders and debt levels. They infer this to mean that non-
lending bankers serve on boards as expertise-providers, while
the role of lending bankers is not very clear. Subsequently,
Kroszner and Strahan (2001a), using Forbes 500 database for
US firms for 1992, investigate the potential trade-offs between
the benefits of direct bank monitoring and the costs of active
bank involvement in firm management, when a banker is rep-
resented on a firm’s board. They argue that, in the selection phase,
one might expect bankers to eschew board representation when
the potential for conflicts of interests is likely to be high. Since
a banker represented board position leads to a conflict be-
tween banking and fiduciary interests, liability costs may
increase for the board-represented bank. Such liability costs,
according to these authors, might arise from two sources. First,
investors and outside creditors may charge the bank with using
its board position to coerce policy concessions from the manage-
ment. Second, a board-represented bank may also be open
to the charge of using its insider information to adjust its
own policies in transactions with the firm, in a manner
wherewith risk is shifted to other creditors. As a consequence
of such costs, bankers, especially existing lenders, may shun
board positions for firms where information asymmetry is high.
More recently, Yafeh and Yosha (2003) have examined the
corporate governance issue using a sample of 180 listed
Japanese manufacturing firms in the chemical industry for
the year 1990. Their results suggest that vis-a-vis large share-
holders, banks are relatively less important in monitoring
managerial moral hazard.
III
The Indian Situation
In the Indian context, there have been several studies exploring
the issue of governance in banking organisations.4  However,
the issue of governance on non-financial firms is, as yet, an
unexplored area of research, and this constitutes the dominant
theme of this paper.
The immediate question of relevance is: why do firms have
bankers on their boards? As mentioned earlier, for the purpose
of the study, we interpret the term ‘banker’ in a rather broad sense
and include both banks as well as financial institutions. In the
erstwhile planned era of economic development, financial in-
stitutions like IDBI, ICICI and IFCI played a vital role as suppliers
of long-term project loans. As supplier of term loans, they have
substantial stake in the units assisted by them. They have been
traditionally appointing nominee directors on the boards of assisted
companies.
While the genesis of the scheme of appointment of nominee
directors dates back to 1971, the origins of the currently prevalent
variant of nominee directors’ role can be traced to the mid-1980s.
In fact, the High-Level Committee on the subject of nominee
directors, in its report submitted in July 1983, directed financial
institutions to establish a dedicated cell to represent the institutions
on the boards of companies. The aim was to ensure that the work
of nominee directors becomes an integral part of the operations
of financial institutions. It was also mentioned that nominee
directors should be appointed on the boards of all MRTP com-
panies assisted by institutions (and on assisted non-MRTP
companies under certain situations).
The basic objective of making such appointments is to help
build up professional management and facilitate effective func-
tioning of the board of directors. In addition, such appointments
also seek to ensure the institution of appropriate corporate policies
and strategies, so as to improve productive efficiency and pro-
mote long-term growth of the assisted companies, keeping in
view the overall interests of the shareholders, within the broad
ambit of government policies and governance practices. This is
clearly elucidated in the recent report of the Naresh Chandara
Committee on Corporate Audit and Governance [Government
of India 2002], which observes that “…the directors are fidu-
ciaries of shareholders, not of the management (para 4.02, italics
in original).5
Not surprisingly, therefore, most of the large financial insti-
tutions normally reserve the right to appoint their own nominee
directors on the boards of the assisted concerns. The actual
appointments of directors are, however made generally after
mutual consultation among the institutions depending upon the
extent of their combined shareholdings, the size of aggregate debt
and individual debt, the role of the lead institution, etc. They do
not exceed a certain percentage of the total strength of the board.
The right of financial institutions to nominate directors on the
boards of assisted companies therefore derives from the contrac-
tual obligation between the assisted companies and institutions,
as also the relevant provisions in the statutes of the latter6.
What are the responsibilities of the nominee directors? In terms
of guidelines evolved by financial institutions, in consultation
with the government of India, the nominee directors are required
to take an active part in the deliberations at the board meetings
and should endeavour to promote good corporate governance in
the company. Of course, a nominee director is not expected to
participate in the day-to-day affairs of the assisted concern. While
it is not expected of the nominee director to take upon himself
the role of investigation into and unearthing violation of laws
by executives/employees of the company, the guidelines enjoin
the person to ensure that the required systems for ensuring
compliance with laws and regulations are in place in the company.
It is expected that wherever any violation comes to the knowledge
of nominee directors, they would take up the same at the board
meetings in a suitable fashion, for necessary follow-up action
and also keep the nominating institution informed about all such
developments. While performing his duties, a nominee director
is expected to focus his attention on a number of variables, such
as performance of the company and the regular payment of dues
to financial institutions.
What has been the role of the nominee directors in India? In
a recent study, Banaji (2004) noted that, “The presence of in-
stitutional nominees is certainly the most distinctive feature of
the Indian corporate governance system” (p 122) and reported
some results based on approximately 160 interviews conducted
between April 1998 to January 2000.7 Notwithstanding various
counter-arguments, the study found a major role for the nominee
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directors. This view stands in contrast to a World Bank (2004)
study which states, “it has been argued that the DFIs, which
often have institutional nominee directors on the boards of
companies, do not bring specialised knowledge and hence
contribute little to the deliberation of the boards”.8  Such con-
flicting claims can only be resolved by a systematic appeal to
the empirical evidence.
IV
Hypotheses, Methodology and the Database
(A) Hypotheses and Variables Selection
The hypothesis we intend to explore can be stated as follows:
ceteris paribus, a company with BoB representation will tend
to exhibit better performance vis-à-vis a company with no banker
on board. The hypothesis leads us to a specification relating to
three sets of variables, viz, the independent variables, the de-
pendent variable, and the control/conditioning variables
summarising the ceteris paribus assumptions.
The dependent variable is a dummy variable signifying the
existence of BoB representation on a non-financial firm,9  (taking
the value 1 if a firm has a banker on board, and zero otherwise).
As far as the measurement of performance of a company is
concerned we have employed the CAPM beta (which relates the
company’s share price to a benchmark index). This variable,
denoted by β, would capture the extent of volatility of the funds
portfolio of a company relative to the benchmark index (sensex
in our case) and could be used as an indicator of the quality of
performance of the firm.10
How far is this measure representative of the governance of
the firm? Apart from the usual difficulty of attempting to locate
empirical quantitative proxies for a qualitative variable like
governance, the problem is compounded by the absence of
sufficient information regarding the failure of companies. How-
ever to the extent that there is a strong relationship between
corporate governance and stock returns, the measure in question
could be reasonably assumed to capture the quality of governance
[Gompers, Ishii and Metrick 2001].11
For identification of the control/conditioning variables, we
have taken into account a number of features of a firm that could
potentially influence the relationship between ‘banker on the
board’ and ‘governance’.
(i) The first feature considered refers to firm size. Since firms
become less dependent on banks for credit as they grow larger
(owing to increased access to alternate sources of finance),
the benefits of having a banker on board are likely to be lower for
large firms. On the other hand, larger firms tend to have larger boards,
providing them opportunities to have multiple outside directors,
including banker(s). Therefore, firm size suggests itself as a
natural control variable. In the present context, size is measured
as the natural logarithm of total assets of the firm.
(ii) Secondly, it is an observed feature that firms with relatively
few tangible assets are likely to be more opaque; in other words,
such firms are likely to experience greater informational asym-
metry problems than firms with more tangible assets, and con-
sequently the costs of financial distress are also more likely to
be dominant in such firms. In view of this phenomenon, bankers
are more likely to be on the boards of firms with a higher
proportion of tangible assets.12 We measure tangibility as the
ratio of net property, plant and equipment to total assets.
(iii) The capital structure of a company can provide information
about the value of a close bank-firm relationship. More heavily
indebted firms can benefit from both the financial expertise
and certification brought by a banker to the board. We therefore
include the debt-equity ratio, defined as the ratio of total debt
(long-term plus short-term) divided by the market value of equity.
(iv) We also introduce an indicator variable (equal to one if
a firm has a commercial paper rating, and zero, otherwise) to
measure a firm’s access to credit from the securities market.
Since commercial paper issuers have access to a close substitute
for bank loans, they will tend to depend less on banks and have less
to gain by having a banker on their boards. Such firms are also
less likely to use bank loans as an important source of credit.
(v) Next, we examine the fraction of total debt that is short-
term, (defined as debt with maturity not exceeding one year).
Since much of short-term debt would comprise of bank credit,
firms relying on a large amount of short-term financing would
be expected to have a relatively high preference for a close
banking relationship [Hoshi et al 1990].
(vi) An additional control variable that we consider is the
interest coverage ratio (defined as the sum of pre-tax income
plus interest expense divided by interest expense). This variable
seeks to explore the vulnerability of the firm to financial distress:
low interest coverage being indicative of possible financial distress.
(vii) To the extent that a firm is performing well, there is limited
necessity of taking a banker on board. This would suggest a
negative relation of firm profitability with our dependent vari-
able. Alternately, it could also be argued that a banker on the
board of a profitable firm seeks to ensure that the firm does not
run into financial distress, which would mean that profitable
firms are likely to have banker representation on their boards.
Therefore, the sign on profit variable is not clear a priori, and
is left free.
(viii) Finally, we also tried to capture the effect of public vis-
à-vis private ownership by the inclusion of a dummy variable.
A positive and significant coefficient on this dummy would
indicate that bankers are more likely to be present on boards of
private firms vis-à-vis public firms.
Across all specifications, we include a dummy for the industry
group to which the firm belongs to account for industry-specific
factors, although we do not report the coefficients on these
indicators.13
(B) Econometric Model
The empirical strategy comprises of estimating the following
cross-section Probit specification.
P(Yi =1) = F(β/Xi) + ξi, (1)
where P(.) denotes the probability of having a banker on the board
of a firm, with Yi being equal to one if a firm has a banker on
the board and zero otherwise; X denotes the set of control
variables specified earlier and ξ is the error term.
Explicitly stated, (1) can be re-written in the form as given
by (1’), i e,
Banker i = γ0 + γ1 *Beta + Σ γ j *Controls j + ξi (1)’j≠1
where Banker is the dependent variable signifying the existence
of a banker on a firm’s board, Beta denotes the extent of volatility
and Controls represents the set of control variables.
Intuitively, more volatile firms are likely to have greater demand
for banking relationships. If the benefits of bank monitoring are
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enhanced through board representation, then the probability of
having a banker on the board is likely to be increased with firm
volatility, which would a priori suggest a positive sign on γ1.
(C) Database
The database employed in the study is from Centre for Monitoring
the Indian Economy’s (CMIE) Prowess database. The dataset
contains financial information on around 8,000 companies, which
are either listed (on either the Bombay Stock Exchange, or the
National Stock Exchange) as well as major unlisted public limited
companies having sales exceeding Rs10 million.14 There is detailed
information available on the financial performance of these
companies, culled from their profit and loss accounts, balance
sheets and stock price data. The database also contains back-
ground information, including ownership pattern, product profile,
plant location and new investment projects for these companies.
The selection of the sample is guided by the availability of
data. From the entire database, we have chosen all manufacturing
firms – public or private limited companies – listed on the NSE,
which maintained their identity and reported their annual ac-
counts for the year ended March 2003. This has been done with
a view to ensuring that we take into consideration all listed firms
that are in operation during this period. Screening for data
consistency on the basis of this criterion led to the selection of
a sample of 1,157 firms in the public and private domain,
belonging exclusively to the manufacturing sector.15
As regards information on the dependent variable (i e, on
whether a firm has a banker on board or otherwise), we resorted
to the Securities and Exchange Board of India’s Electronic Data
Information Filing and Retrieval Systems (EDIFAR) database.16
Table 1 compares the median characteristics of the banker and
no-banker cross-section samples for the year 2003. The banker
firm tends to be roughly twice the size of a non-banker firm,
and more stable (i e, with lower beta) than the non-banker firm.
While the banker firms typically have higher debt/equity ratios,
they tend to have relatively lower proportion of short-term bank
debt relative to total debt. The far higher fraction of tangible assets
to total assets for banker firms, serves to increase their capacity
to make public offerings. The interest coverage ratio is signi-
ficantly lower in the banker firm, but the ratio of profit to total
assets is roughly double in the banker-firm as compared to its
non-banker counterpart.
V
Main Results
(A) Benchmark Model
Table 2 contains the estimation results of the Probit model as
specified in (1’). As the results (model 1) make it clear, bankers
are more likely to be on boards of larger firms. Secondly, a banker
is more likely to be present on boards of public limited firms
vis-à-vis private limited ones. Taken together, these two obser-
vations capture the fact that larger public limited firms are more
likely to have a banker representation on their boards.
The model was subsequently extended to incorporate addi-
tional features of firms (model 2). While the earlier observations
carry through in this case as well, it is furthermore observed that
bankers are likely to be present on boards of firms with higher ratios
of tangible to total assets, and with lower fractions of short-term
debt to total debt. In other words, firms with less informational
asymmetry and lower proportion of short-term loans are likely
to exhibit greater BoB representation. Since greater exposure to
short-term loans is possibly reflective of increased bank credit
dependence, this inverse relationship between short-term debt
and BoB would be broadly supportive of the Booth and Deli
(1999) result – bankers on firm boards primarily serve as expertise
providers rather than direct monitors.
In our next model elaboration, profitability and debt equity
ratios were included as additional explanatory variables (model 3).
It was then observed that the coefficient on asset tangibility was
swamped by that on the profit variable, which entered with a
negative sign. Intuitively, bankers are more likely to be present
on boards of less profitable firms. Less profitable firms, being
relatively more prone to financial distress, are likely to have
greater banker representation than otherwise. The insigni-
ficance of the debt equity ratio at conventional levels, is indi-
cative of the fact that the capital structure of a firm, has a
limited role to play in influencing the likelihood of banker
representation on firm boards. This is akin to the US evidence,
wherein it has been observed that leverage does not affect the
Table 1: Characteristics of Firms ( 2003), by Presence of a
Banker on the Board
Variable Banker-on-the- No-Banker-on-the-
Board Firms Board Firms
Log (asset) 256 130
Beta 0.64 0.66
Tangible asset/asset 199 63
Debt/equity 1.26 0.39
Interest coverage ratio 0.52 1.73
Bank borrowings/borrowings 38 48
Short-term bank borrowing/borrowing 25 35
Profit/asset 1.66 0.77
Memo
Number of firms  of which 383 774
Publicly-owned 8 29
Table 2: Probit Estimates Relating Firm and Industry
Characteristics to the Presence of a Banker
on the Board in 2003
Variables Model I Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Beta 0.139 0.134 0.089 0.105
(0.086)*** (0.088)*** (0.088)*** (0.089)
Ln (asset) 0.635 0.723 0.901 0.908
(0.078)* (0.101)* (0.104)* (0.106)*
Ownership dummy -1.012 -0.842 (0.264)* -0.995 -0.992
(0.255)* (0.285)*  (0.283)*
CP-rating – 0.109 0.056 0.061
(0.406) (0.406) (0.406)
Short-term bank debt/total debt – -0.011 (0.002)* -0.010 0.011
(0.001)* (0.002)*
Tangible assets/assets – 0.0001 0.0002 0.00004
(0.0001)* (0.0001) (0.0001)
Debt/equity – 0.002 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Profit/asset – – -0.003 -0.003
(0.001)* (0.001)*
Interest coverage ratio – – – -0.0035
(0.0014)**
Intercept -1.836 -1.713 -2.015 2.036
(0.195)*  (0.454)*  (0.455)* (0.457)*
Pseudo-R2 0.132 0.160 0.189 0.193
Number of observations 1144 1144 1144 1087
Notes: (1) Figures in brackets are standard errors.
(2) All equations include industry dummies.
(3) *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent,
respectively.
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likelihood of banker presence on firm boards [Kroszner and
Strahan 2001b].
Finally, in the fully expanded version of the model (model 4),
we considered an additional explanatory variable in the form of
the interest coverage ratio. This variable was found to be negative
and statistically significant at conventional levels. This would
suggest that greater vulnerability of the firm is associated with
an increased likelihood of banker representation on firm boards.
Across all models (1 to 4), it is evident that the coefficient
γ1 is positive. In other words, bankers are likely to be represented
on boards of relatively riskier firms. As mentioned earlier, demand
for banking relationships is likely to be greater for volatile firms.
To the extent that the benefits of bank monitoring are enhanced
through board representation, the probability of a banker on board
increases with firm volatility. Summing up, large risky and
vulnerable public firms are likely to exhibit banker representa-
tion, primarily in their role as expertise providers.
(B) Robustness Check
The Probit model does not directly take into account the size
of the board, although the same has been indirectly controlled
for, by including firm size. All other factors remaining constant,
a banker is more likely to be found on a larger than a smaller
board. If the characteristics we have included in the Probit model
are simply providing information about the number of opportu-
nities for a banker to be on a firm’s board, then the results could
be consistent with a purely random allocation of bankers. In
addition, it might well happen than some boards have more than
one banker, a fact which is not fully exploited by the present set-up.
To adjust for board size and to account for the incidence of
multiple bankers on a firm’s board, we run a Tobit model. (A
Tobit model is employed because several of the observations (774
of the 1,157 observations) are censored to zero. Accordingly,
the dependent variable is reformulated as the number of bankers
on the board of a firm divided by the total number of board
members. This leads us to the following specification where the
latent dependent variable (banker on board) follows the
observability rule:
Yi = Xi β + ξi if Y*i = Xi β + ξi>0
Yi = 0 otherwise (2)
The Tobit estimates are reported in Table 3, which contains
the same set of variables as in the Probit model. In terms of
statistical significance and relative magnitudes, the results are
almost identical to that obtained in the Probit model. Thus, larger
public firms are more likely to have bankers on their boards,
although riskiness is of limited consideration in this case. More
importantly, the results suggest that firms with a lower proportion
of short-term bank debt are likely to experience higher incidence
of board members, once again supportive of the role of bankers
as expertise providers. The results are thus robust to different
definitions of the dependent variable as well as to different
estimation techniques.
VI
Concluding Remarks
The paper makes an attempt to identify the factors influencing
the inclusion of bankers on (non-financial and listed) company
boards as well as exploring the implications of their presence.
This is expected to shed light on the role that bankers play on
the boards they serve. The findings reveal that after controlling
for various firm-specific features, bankers primarily play the role
of expertise providers on boards of non-financial firms as op-
posed to a direct monitoring role.
The board structure of corporates has implications for corporate
governance practice in the context of the financial liberalisation
process underway in India. As liberalisation proceeds and bankers
get increasingly freed from restrictions on their asset portfolio,
the efficacy of the legal system in protecting creditor rights will
be a key ingredient of good governance practices. One of the
ways in which large creditors, such as banks, can ensure that
their funds are not misappropriated is to have board represen-
tation. However, as the discussion and analysis presented here,
would suggest, this could create a conflict between the fiduciary
and self-interest roles of the banker. A possible way out of the
dilemma is to allow banks to have equity stakes in firms. Keeping
this consideration in view, banks are currently permitted to hold
equity stakes up to 5 per cent of the outstanding advances of
the previous year.17
Several further areas of research are opened up by this line
of thinking. Although we sought to determine the role of bankers
on company boards, their influence should be felt beyond debt
policy. This would suggest the examination of alternative depen-
dent variables, such as dividend policy and capital spending.
Secondly, owing to paucity of data, the study was unable to
examine how lending status affects the allocation of bank
executives. For this, one needs to ascertain the bank lending to
specific firms. Alternately, several banks (with respective board
representation) might be lending to a firm, in which case the bank
with the maximum quantum of loans might be termed as having
‘main bank’ lending relationship and the others as having ‘minor’
lending relationships. It might be of interest to examine whether
the strength of lending relationship influences the presence of
bankers on boards and if so, to what extent. Third, we have treated
Table 3: Tobit Estimates Relating Firm and Industry
Characteristics to the Presence of a Banker
on the Board in 2003
Model I Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Beta 0.135 0.127 0.105 0.116
(0.101)*** (0.101)*** (0.101)*** (0.102)***
Ln (asset) 0.636 0.692 0.767 0.787
(0.092)* (0.116)* (0.118)*  (0.121)*
Ownership dummy -0.994 -0.819 -0.875 -0.883
(0.305)*  (0.310)* (0.320)* (0.319)*
CP-rating – 0.088 0.058 0.053
(0.483) (0.483) (0.484)
Short-term bank debt/total debt – -0.010 -0.011 -0.0108
(0.002)* (0.002)* (0.002)*
Tangible assets/assets – -0.0001 -0.00004 -0.0001
(0.0001) (0.001) (0.0001)
Debt/equity – 0.0005 0.0005 0.00004
(0.001)  (0.001) (0.001)
Profit/asset – – -0.002 -0.001
(0.001)* (0.001)*
Interest coverage ratio – – – -0.003
(.001)**
Intercept -02.311 -2.11 -2.240 -2.287
(0.243)*  (0.541)* (0.543)* (0.545)*
Pseudo-R2 0.024 0.028 0.031 0.089
Number of observations 1144 1099 1099 1087
Notes: (1) Figures in brackets are standard errors.
(2) All equations include industry dummies.
(3) *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent,
respectively.
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lenders and other bankers as having fixed roles. It would be of
interest to separate the role of bankers on a board in an executive
capacity from that of bankers in a non-executive capacity. These
(among many other issues) might constitute a promising agenda
for future research.
Email: nachane@igidr.ac.in
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Notes
1 The term ‘banks’ in the present set-up refers to both banks and financial
institutions.
2 Thought the paper the words ‘company’ and ‘firm’ are used interchangeably.
3 In some sense, the theme is related to the corporate governance literature.
Although the issue of corporate governance has begun to receive attention
in the Indian context, limited empirical work on the same has been
attempted. Some recent analysis in this context focuses on issues like
the effect of foreign ownership on the performance of Indian firms
[Chibber and Majumdar 1999], performance of firms affiliated to
diversified business groups [Khanna and Palepu 2000], the role of large
shareholders in corporate governance [Sarkar and Sarkar 2000] and
corporate governance in banking [Das and Ghosh 2004] and corporate
firms [Ghosh and Sensarma 2004].
4 Illustratively, given the dominant public sector nature of Indian banking,
Reddy (1999) put forward the question: whether it is a bank or financial
institution, if it is in competition with other institutions and more so
if it is having private shareholders, should it be registered under Companies
Act or should it be under a separate statute? After all, a separate statute
other than Companies Act is justified only when there are governmental-
regulatory or statutory-monopoly functions. Statutory form, when
inappropriate causes avoidable burden on parliament/legislature, on the
bureaucracy in government and on the enterprise itself. More recently,
Gopinath (2004) raised the issue relating to conflict of interest in the
financial sector. Four areas of the financial service industry have a high
potential for conflicts of interest: underwriting and research in investment
banking, auditing and consulting in accounting firms, credit assessment
and consulting in rating agencies, and universal banking.
5 The Committee also recommended that no less than 50 per cent of the
board of directors of any listed company as well as unlisted companies
with a threshold paid-up share capital/turnover should comprise of
independent directors. Some recent survey evidence, based on the 30
largest companies of the BSE Sensex (banks excluded) reports that in
roughly a third of the companies, independent directors comprised over
50 per cent (in some cases, over 75 per cent) of their board strength,
whereas there numbers varied between 25-33 per cent in another third
of the companies [Ghosh 2005].
6 The threshold limit of institutional assistance for mandatory exercise of
nomination rights is normally Rs 50 crore. Institutions have the right
to appoint Nominee Directors where the institutional shareholdings
exceed 26 per cent of the company’s equity or where the company is
facing major problems, which may lead to sickness of the unit.
7 Banaji (2000) reported that as of end-1999, IDBI had 470 nominees
spread over 1,026 companies, and in ICICI ( as of March 2000) there
were 231 nominees supervising a total of 436 companies.
8 In fact, The World Bank Corporate Governance Principle IIIA states that,
“The corporate governance framework should recognise the rights of
stakeholders as established by law and encourage active cooperation
between corporations and stakeholders in creating wealth, jobs, and the
sustainability of financially sound enterprises”. In this context World
Bank (2004) notes that “Secured creditors offering long term debt have
the right to be represented on the board through ‘Nominee Directors’”.
9 The banker may either be one from a commercial bank, or in several
instances, from a development financial institution (DFI). We make no
distinction between the two and simply identify him as a banker.
10 The firm’s capability is hypothesised as being inversely related to
this volatility.
11 Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2001) used the incidence of 24 different
provisions to build a ‘Governance Index’ for about 1,500 firms per year,
and then studied the relationship between this index and several forward-
looking performance measures during the 1990s for the US and found
that the governance index is highly correlated with the stock performance
of a company. Their results indicated that in 1990, a one-point increase
in the index is associated with a 2.4 percentage-point lower value for
Tobin’s Q. By 1999, this difference had increased significantly, with
a one-point increase in the index associated with an 8.9 percentage point
lower value for Tobin’s Q.
12 In a way, this echoes what the Naresh Chandra Committee observed.
To quote “respected, well-run and transparent companies in India have
never faced the problem of getting top class independent directors. The
market knows that such companies choose the best-in-class people, and
give them the oversight strategic space that they would ordinarily expect”
(para 4.22).
13 We consider ten such industry group, which, in alphabetical order are:
auto ancillaries, chemicals, computers, diversified, drug, electrical
machinery, food, heavy industries, others and textiles. For identification
purpose, the dummy variable for others is omitted, so that the response
of other industry groups is relative to this category.
14 In addition, an entity qualifies for inclusion in the database if the average
sum of sales and total assets is more than or equal to Rs 200 million
for the latest audited financial results and the entity is not listed.
15 Firms that underwent merger/acquisition during this period were dropped
from the sample. Since the focus of the study is the effect of having
a banker on the board of a non-financial firm, services firms have,
accordingly, not been considered for the study.
16 Under the head ‘Corporate Governance’ within EDIFAR, information
is provided on the board of directors of the concerned company and
more importantly, whether the director is from a bank/financial institution.
We corresponded the name of the firm with the fact as to whether the
firm has a bank/financial institution representation on its board of
directors.
17 D’Souza (2000) has, however, expressed scepticism of these limits.
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